>> Thank you very much, and
all of those beautiful titles.

I have to thank Chris, he's
a very good title thinker.

>> Can we get a little bit of the light
away from the screen, is that possible?

We have changed the title because of course
you have to change the title but this is also

because there is an election about to come out.

So we have Riki [phonetic] at, the speech today.

>> Yeah I know.

>> More to the election and the
issues around this election,

so it still deals with red and yellow.

But red and yellow has got a little bit boring.

So we've moved a little bit beyond that.

The Thai Prime Minister recently announced he
would dissolve the parliament on 3rd of May.

Meaning, a general election will take place in
late June around 6 months ahead of the deadline.

This is much more than just another
election because of the recent history.

The results of the last three elections
have been overturned in different ways.

One was voided by the courts, another
was overthrown by a military coup,

and the third was negated when a court
judgment dissolved the ruling party.

What's more?

In 2009 and again, in 2010 Thailand was walked

by street demonstrations whose
principle demand was to have an election.

That caused-- the government refused
that demand and brought in the military

to dissolve the protests and in
the last occasion in May 9th,

2010 the death toll is now 93, the
injury toll is up to around a 1,000

and 30 yard buildings were torched.

What's even more, the call-- - this
call for an election has being greeted

by total dismay from some very powerful figures.

Sodsri Sattyadharm, member of the
election commission said outright,

"I don't want an election, because it
would to lead to a revolution from below

like in North Africa" Some prominent
journalists have voiced the fear

that the election might lead to the return

of the ousted premier Thaksin
Shinawatra, and therefore more conflict.

And for several months, there have been
constant rumors of a coup, an open discussion

about forming a "national government"
which means an unelected one.

Several business figures have spoken
longingly about the China model, meaning,

an authoritarian government that
oversees rapid economic growth.

In a, a survey done by the Asia Foundation
released two weeks ago, between last year

and this year , the number of people in Bangkok
who say, they strongly support democracy

as the motto for Thailand dropped
from 57 percent to 27 percent.

Sondhi Limthongkul who was head of the
Yellow Shirt, People's Alliance for Democracy

which has been so powerful in the
last couple of years went further.

He said we need to shut down
the government for 3 to 5 years,

so we can clean a way the
dirt in the political system.

The, the rhetoric of the PAD
over time has been coming--

have taken on more and more of the flavor
of fascist rhetoric of several decades ago.

It's very strange for a premier
to announce the dissolution ahead

of time giving away the advantage
of surprise to the opposition.

Clearly, there's a special reason he did so.

There's a rumor that he also brought
in a foreign research company to carry

out an opinion poll, in order to show
to his bosses, which means the military

that he has a chance of winning so that
they will let him run this election.

So this is not just much more
than just another on election.

It's an election about whether Thailand
should continue having a semblance

of parliamentary democracy or not.

And at this point, the result
is far from certain.

So we want to address today, how
did Thailand get to this point?

And what happens next?

>> And in order to answer the question
that Chris has, probably, we would--

we need to look at the socioeconomic
and political context

in which those conflicts have a reason.

First, I will look-- we will look at the
inequalities as a background and followed

by the challenge, which further
led to the reaction.

>> Okay.

>> Thailand is a very unequal society compared
to its neighbor and compared to countries

of a similar level of development.

Income inequality has worsened
steadily over the years

and has improved only a little in recent years.

Inequality in the ownership of
assets is even more staggering.

The top 10 percent on 69 percent more
than the bottom-- [Inaudible Remark] --

69 times more than the bottom 10 percent.

And you could see also that the
difference between the second--

this second commentary and the first
commentary is also still very not.

This is a situation not only in Thailand.

You'll find it in the US, similar kind
of figure will be represented in terms

of the top 1 percent having this huge gap.

Economic inequality does not of itself
create political division or conflict

but it certainly forms background again to
each other forms of inequality, political,

social, and cultural extroversion.

In particular, power and access to
power are very badly distributed.

Thailand is ruled by a kind
of oligarchy as it's based

on 3 old institutions which
have never been reformed.

First, there is the bureaucracy, which developed
from an old feudal nobility and still conceives

of itself as a ruling caste, distinguished from
the mass of the people by the uniforms, rituals,

grand architecture and other
marker of differences.

The second, the military that rule-- the
military ruled the country for half a century.

It still highly politicizes and
believes it has a special role

in the polity of right of intervention.

And third, we have the monarchy who has tended
to grow stronger and take among intrusive role

in politics, as the length of the reign has
steadily enhanced the monarch's personal status.

And we must also recognize that in
Thailand, there has be no mass movement

which has challenged these old
institutions like in many other countries

which has anti-colonial movements
that's serve the purpose.

The new urban middle class that developed
over the past century and especially

over its later half has tended, is small
in number and has tended to align itself

with the old elite rather than challenging it.

And that's partly because this middle
class is rather small and insecure.

And this middle class did try to
promote elective democracy in the 1970's

and early 1990's to end absolutism and to
control the military but it stopped there.

In this situation, the idealogy is, we
justify that privilege remain in place.

The distribution of public goods is very
unequal, there's no effort to institute the rule

of law as that would undermine that privilege.

Next, let us look at the challenge, what
happened with the challenge to this oligarchy

and the concentration of power situation.

Over recent years, the situation
has come under serious challenge.

And this challenge is essentially--

>> Political.

>> -- political with underlying economic.

The political is a demand for inclusiveness
for more equitable access to power

and better distribution of public goods.

The demand has been lushly
mounted through the ballot box.

The background for this challenge lies in the
great economic change of the past decades.

You can see in this graph, today the average
Thai has an income 3 times that of his parents

and 6 times that of his grandparents.

All these Thai peasant farming,
has virtually disappeared

and replaced by market-oriented agriculture.

Many have moved from the village
to the city while others rotate

between the rural and urban economies.

And even in the countryside
itself, the lifestyle,

and the urban facilities has also increased.

The inequities in Thai society, meanwhile have
got significantly worst in recent decades,

but far more people are in the position to
see them, understand them, and resent them.

With rising incomes, people has more education,

more access to information,
more access to protect--

-- more assets to protect, different
hopes and desire for themselves,

and especially for their children, and
more demands on government obviously,

for public goods, for legal process, and so on.

Yet, many people find that they are blocked by
some kind of glass ceilings of various kinds.

Power is still so concentrated in the
capital, opportunities are monopolized

by the old elite, and established middle class.

School has spread everywhere but the
quality of the school are very varied,

and good if you'd find good school in Bangkok
and big cities but not in the provincial area.

And you'll be surprised to find that 80 percent

of Thai household still do
not have access to tap water.

They have access to tap water
in their households.

They can use tap water but they have to go
and get it from somewhere into the household.

The-- Moreover, the old elite and middle
class often continue to treat provincial

and lower echelons as people as
if they were all still as poor

and uneducated as they were 2 generations ago.

Jansack Penthong [phonetic] a former economic
turned media personality, said on television,

just before all of these problem, that the
most unknown easterner could aspire to become,

is [foreign language], or a
house servant [foreign language].

This remark was highly resented, during the
demonstrations in Central Bangkok last May,

newspaper rant cartoons showing the
demonstrators as buffalos, and opponents held

up signs calling them uneducated people,

showing how deeply uneducated they
themselves are, you can see in the-- here.

Resentment gather through the 1990's expressed
largely through grassroots organization

and protest campaign on rule issues like
land rights, access to natural resources,

agricultural prices, by and large,
these campaigns were not successful.

The government either suppressed them or
ignored them, meaning, that resentment festered.

In the '80s and '90s, there was no attempt
to use the ballot box to pursue change.

The parliament was not conceived
as an institution

through which the mass, the
people could affect change.

It was a captive of money which
candidates invested large sum in direct

or indirect vote buying, ensuring that well as
was a qualification for admission, as an MP.

Over 3 quarters of the seats we're occupied by
male business entrepreneurs who represented less

than 3 percent of the total population.

The parliament operated lushly as a
businessmen's club, sharing out the budget,

and networking among themselves, and negotiating
with the bureaucracy, for the ordinary Thai,

the parliament was remote and
unimportant to their lives.

That situation changed completely
over a decade that began in 1997.

The vote became something of value, and
in this process, Thaksin Shinawatra,

the billionaire businessman who turned
politician, plays an important role.

However, we need to look
at the background first.

First came the 1997 financial crisis, it
caused real pain for those in the middle

and lower ranks of society, prompting a massive
wave of protest, and further politicization.

It also undermined the confidence and the
legitimacy of the old ruling oligarchy,

creating cracks from which new
political trends could emerge.

Second, in the 1997 constitution,
adopted in the [inaudible] of opposition

from the old oligarchy during the
turmoil crisis, significantly--

and significantly decentralized power
to elective local government bodies.

Up to this point, a Thai citizen had voted only
once every 3 to 4 years for the parliament,

which seem so remote as I've mentioned.

And but, as a result of decentralization and
other reforms, the citizens now voted not only

for an MP but also a senator, village head,
local councilor, mayor, and provincial council.

Through the decentralization of power--

though this decentralization of
power was still rather limited,

in the election for local government,
citizens voted for candidates they knew,

and were in a position to
evaluate their contribution.

In short, there was a rapid education
in the value of the franchise,

the vote to bring about direct
material benefits.

And these brought about a
revolution in the structure

of local politics in the years that followed.

Before, MP's and prospective MP's had
found no patronage down to a range

of local brokers in the green, in this one.

Local officials, prominent businessmen,
lottery agents, gangster who get out--

who could get out abroad
and work as a canvassers.

Now, local leaders, factions
and activist group emerged.

They could bargain among prospective candidates
for their support, or by positive altogether,

and deal directly with the political parties,

and central government agencies,
and sometimes support all MP's.

The transformation was not total.

Patronage still matters, circumstances differ
from a locality to a locality, but as a whole,

politics became more susceptible
to pressure from below.

The third factor of change stemming
from 1997 was Thaksin Shinawatra,

who served as a channel funneling the rising
pressure from below into a national politics.

Thaksin met a multibillion fortune
from [inaudible] monopoly concession

to run the first mobile phone service.

He launched into politics and was
elected prime minister in 2001.

He then vastly increased his
family fortune by abuse of power,

but also because he became a leader
of this force bubbling up from below.

We want to highlight the cause
circumstances rather than the man.

The situation was right for the emergence
of a popular leader of some kind.

In other words, we think that if there had been
no Thaksin, there could have been someone else

who would took, who would take his place.

And Thaksin did not fully understand this.

When he launched his bid for power in
1998 and 2001, he presented himself

as a successful businessman who would primarily
represent the interest of the business,

and whose main goal was achieving
rapid economic growth.

But as he gradually lost middle class
support, he gradually transformed himself

into a highly attractive popular leader.

How he did, how he did it?

First, he enacted some simple distributive
reforms, universal healthcare, microcredit,

agricultural price support, which
had a big impact on ordinary people.

He showed that national politic
could bring about change

that affected the lives of the people directly.

Second, his whole scheme in particular,
which offered the same benefit to everybody

as a right, encapsulated a new
concept of the citizen, and hence,

was popular far beyond the
actual usage of the scheme.

And here, study has shown that the universal
healthcare scheme has reduced the poverty level

by one third because it reduced the
cost of healthcare for ordinary people.

Third, Thaksin increasingly cultivated a close,
hot relationship between leader and people

through the media, through up country tours,
and through rhetoric which was very different

from the cool, aloof model of the
old oligarchy position of politics.

In world wide perspective, this style,
was the standard of mass politicians

in the media-drenched age, but in Thailand,
it's something very revolutionary and very new.

And Thaksin was rewarded
with rock star-like acclaim.

People felt his leadership empowered them.

Fourth, as he grew to understand
and to like his support,

Thaksin became more radical in his rhetoric.

He increasingly, not only distinguished
himself from the old oligarchy, bureaucrats,

old style politicians, and
the journalist, and adjourned,

co-opted into the old oligarchy
culture but he criticized them

and rebelled in that criticism of him.

By doing so, he cut reserves of
resentment normally hidden from inside,

in Thailand repressed political culture.

>> Now we want to follow the reaction to
this that has taken place really since 2005.

We want to argue that this turmoil since
2005 has to be read not simply as a reaction

against Thaksin but as a reaction against the
eruption of new forces into Thai politics.

Reaction has come from the old oligarchy,

and from the large sections
of the urban middle class.

The military has returned to active
political involvement through the 2006 coup,

through massive interference
in elections particularly

in the 2007 election probably the
most corrupt election in Thai history,

corrupted by the military using public
money, and through propaganda campaigns,

through intrigue, and through
strengthening its own institutional power.

Royalists, suppose have been
prominent in the reaction.

The cry of monarchy in danger was used to
rally a desperate coalition against Thaksin

and no effort was made from
above to prevent this.

Leaders of the reaction also
made explicit appeal

to the class interests of
the urban middle class.

The whole discourse of the class was bought
into this conflict, not by the lower echelons

but by the middle class saying,
we need to defend ourselves.

Arguing that they would lose power and privilege

if the political system became
more responsive to mass demands.

In the political movements
that stand from the 1970's,

the Thai middle class is generally being
analyzed as a spearhead of the pressure

to control the military stifle
dictatorship and promote elective democracy.

In much of the theorizing, about democracy,
the middle class plays a prominent role

to the whole democratic transitions literature.

But it is clear that in Thailand, large parts of
the urban middle class have had second thoughts.

This is often explained as a revulsion
against Thaksin and his corruption.

But the debate has began-- began much beyond
just removing Thaksin to contemplate qualifying

or abandoning elective democracy altogether.

Over recent years, several
proposals have been made.

One of the first, encapsulated in
the 2005 book entitled Royal Powers,

was to increase the powers of
the monarchy as a counterweight

against "corrupt elective politicians."

The details of the scheme
are fuzzy but they seem

to entail enhancing the monarch's
power of veto and appointment.

The political scientist-- [inaudible] in
a 2006 book proposed upweighting the power

of the monarchy in what he
called the aristocracy

of which mainly meant the
military bureaucracy and judiciary.

And you can see that many
of the reforms implemented

by the post 2006 coup government
largely follow the next ideas.

Reducing the power of parliament in
favor of the bureaucracy and judiciary,

vastly increasing the power of the military
fueling new Internal Security Act and so on.

In 2007, Sondhi and PAD, the Yellow Shirts
floated the idea of abandoning the principle

of one person-one vote and constituting the
parliament by mixture in appointment an election

by occupational and other groups.

PAD has consistently tried to delegitimize
the parliament and the electorate by arguing

that the mass of voters are uneducated and hence
elect corrupt politicians who then misgovern.

Several figures who promote floated
proposals for a national government,

several in the last few weeks which
ultimately means an appointed government,

an installation of the old oligarchy.

Over the past year, there's been almost constant
movements of schemes to manufacture a crisis

in which this proposal could be bought
forward particularly the fermenting disconte--

fermenting conflict on the
boarder with Cambodia,

in which you could actually create a
state of war in which you bend over,

and you could go for a new kind of system.

The Red Shirt Movement has emerged to
counter this conservative reaction.

It's a rather complex movement.

The original core which emerged in 2006,
were activist groups particularly made

up of old leftists who were the first to come
out in open opposition to the coup of 2006.

They were then joined by former supporters
of Thaksin from his core area of support

in Bangkok, the Upper North and the Northeast.

But over time, a movement has attracted
more and more former democracy activists

and ordinary citizens who are just-- who
had in the past been opposed to Thaksin,

but are fed up with the return
to military influence.

The main demand of this movement
from the beginning was

to restore a democracy by holding elections.

After an election was held in
2007, that demand dropped but when

that government was then overthrown by kind
of judicial coup in late 2008, it returned.

A second treaty bond has been
to revive that 1997 constitution

which means setting aside the
charter written off to the 2006 coup.

A major strategy of the Red Shirt
Movement has been to hold mass rallies

and to use the color red to emphasize the sheer
size of their support whether in stadium rallies

like this or in street possessions.

In March to May of last year, the Red
Shirt movement reached the kind of peak

when thousands streamed into Bangkok in a--

an atmosphere which can only
be described as carnival.

And through enthusiastic support
from parts of the city population

and sympathy from even from some in the army.

But over a two month protest they were
tactically outmaneuvered by the army,

resulting in a violent end to the protest which
probably diminished their support somewhat.

Despite this repression, the movement has not
being coward, and this is really very important

when you've had this kind of repression against
popular politics in the past, it's worth it,

if everything have tended to
disobey and go away and people hide,

but the Red Shirt Movement is totally uncoward
by the two incidents of the last 2 years.

Over the past year, the Red Shirt Movement
has concentrated on local organization,

political schools and developing means of
communication through print and through radio.

Let us now look at the possible upcoming
election, and first look at the background

of election results over the past decade.

The election system, which has been in place
has 2 parts, it has territorial constituencies

which have been, which were 400 of them in 2001,

2005 average vote in the
constituency is about 75,000.

And then hundred votes, 106 which is known
as the partylist which is a national vote

by party exchange a bit in the last
election but I think of it that way.

This was the result in 2001
when Thaksin came to power.

In all of these charts, the red part, the red
constituencies means the pro-Thaksin party,

in this case Thai Rak Thai
and the blue is the democrats,

the head of the current ruling coalition.

And the-- so yes this part here is Bangkok,
this is greater Bangkok which fits in there

but it is expanded 'cause of-- 'cause
of forces, higher population and city.

What you can see in this poll, is that
Thaksin does very well in very large parts

of Bangkok particularly in
the Upper North and then here,

things are really still very scattered.

We are still in the old system when many
small localized parties held its way.

Thai Rak Thai won around 2/5 of the vote
in just short of an absolute majority.

The democrats stop dominated
the South and the Western hills,

that the Northeast was still utterly fragmented.

This changed totally by 2005.

The end of his 4-year term, Thaksin not only
did what no other Thai Prime Minister had done

which was to get to last the
4-year term to go to an election,

but he won a complete and utter landslide.

Most of the little parties which we saw
in the previous chart had disappeared,

usually absorbed into his party
moving towards a 2-party system.

Only the green one Chart Thai survived.

Democrat party held the South but
collapsed just about everywhere else.

Thai Rak Thai dominated the North,
Northeast center and significantly Bangkok.

We're here now in 2005 where
Thaksin has still got very--

he sweeps Bangkok all except two seats
to the democrats in the various center.

The poll in 2006 was boycotted by the
opposition, and eventually scrapped by courts.

So only one party was standing,
so it's more like a referendum.

So we could-- all we could do is measure
the strength of the vote for Thai Rak Thai

so the more, the weight of the shading,
the higher the percentage of vote.

And you can see it's clearly higher in the
Northeast now, the 2 areas of concentration,

the Northeast, it's pretty higher

in the Northeast particularly the
central part in the Upper North up here.

If we compare the 2006 poll to the
2005 poll, we can see the polarization.

In the red parts that are shaded red,
the actual absolute number of votes

for Thai Rak Thai increased
between 2005 and 2006 and--

but if it's in blue, and the
heavier the blue it reduced.

So you can see a polarization in the
areas that are supportive of Thaksin,

his voting is getting even stronger, even
now he's now, he himself is now under attack

and everywhere else, it is declining.

In 2007, the post coup constitution had
returned to a multi member constituency system

so you can't map it in the same way,
you have to map each MP as a dot

so we have to draw it differently.

If you put lines on the map, it
starts to make a small sense.

The vote for PPP which is now
the success of the Thai Rak Thai,

was backed roughly to the same level as 2001.

But what is mostly interesting, is that
the regional party is now very, very clear.

Thaksin's party wins in-- wins
in the Upper North, the Northeast

and around Bangkok, the outskirts
of Bangkok here.

Whereas, the Democrats within the South
and the central part of the capital.

The center and lower north are very fragmented
returning to the old pattern of voting

for local favorite's, irrespective of party.

But one very interesting thing to
do with this map is to compare it

to a map of ethnolinguistic groups.

And as you can see, the line that is cutting
down here, essentially between the central part

and the Thaksin vote-- the Thaksin
vote is almost, in an uncanny way,

follows the line that divides the
ethnolinguistic groups in Thailand.

What this means is, the bit in green in the
middle as that speakers of central Thai,

if you like the area of old Siam.

That-- And those in the darker red at
the North, this is [inaudible] the--

the sort of red out here, this
is basically [inaudible], okay.

And these are the crossover
areas in his command.

But as you can see very clearly, the support
for Thaksin is at it's strongest in these areas

which were parts that were
incorporated into Siam

by fundamentally by conquest
in the 19th century.

There are kinds of things underneath what is
going on now which are not always very explicit.

What then is the situation with the party?

Thaksin's party now runs as prototype,
this was the situation in the parliament

after the last change in late 2008.

Pheu Thai is still the largest party with
a 189, but the coalition that was set

up by the military in December 2008 headed by
the Democrats with a slightly lower number,

and then a number of smaller parties which
we're put together in a-- in a coalition.

What then is the situation of the
parties going in to this election?

Thaksin's party is in something of a mess.

The leader is still in self-exile.

Many of its former MP's are still under
a Thai [inaudible] ban from politics.

In many localities, there are strains
between the parties MP's and the Red Shirts.

The Red Shirt agitate as they're complaining
that the MP's did not give them enough support

over the demonstrations of
particularly of last year.

But still, the chances of the
party should not be underestimated.

Just in the last few days, Thaksin has
pushed his youngest sister Yingluck

to become party leader for
the election campaign.

She doesn't have much political experience.

Probably, her greatest asset is
that she smiles all the time.

[Laughter] But she will put
the Shinawatra surname

on the ballot and that I think could be magic.

It could significantly increase
the parties showing.

I think it will be very interesting what will--
what will happen with her in the next few weeks,

it'll be start of demonstrating to kind
of undermine her in one way or another.

The Democrats have undergone a kind
of revolution over the last year.

They've completely abandoned their old passive
minimalist Laissez-faire approach to policy

and have copied virtually every
part of Thaksin's populous platform.

They have not yet delivered
it, however, in the same way.

Thaksin said "This is yours by
right," and people like that.

But that's, the democrats
say, like the old bureaucrats

"We give you this as a present,"
patronage style.

And the Democrats still don't seem to
understand that there is a huge difference

to that in today's mass politics.

They have made some very interesting
changes to the electoral laws,

shifting seats allowing themselves
to withdraw a constituency boundaries

that could significantly increase their chances.

They have a lot of army backpacking,
and they have mainstream media support.

That shift, if any, is their chance to get
somewhere near a majority in the parliament.

But that's still probably unlikely.

But here's a third very interesting element.

The Bhumjaithai or Thai Pride Party is a
return of an old formula, big business money,

influence in the bureaucracy, political
will or dealers and military backing.

The big business backing comes especially
from 2 firms with interests in Bangkok Airport

which has been a honeypot of
corruption for a decade now.

King Power that runs the Duty Free
and the Sino-Thai Construction Firm

that built the Apple Link [phonetic].

In the current coalition, this party
got control of the interior ministry

and has used back position to put supportive
officials, governors and police chiefs

in key constituencies important
in this election.

The effective leader of the party Newin
Chidchob, is expert at using money,

[inaudible] candidates and votes.

So this is going into the selection with the
democrats to a sort of policy side and look

at the nice guys, they have a leader who
[inaudible] and can speak wonderful English

and beside them is this party that can play
dirty old fashion politics of buying out support

or coercing support in one way or another.

We then settle smaller parties
of which probably,

the most interesting is "Perperdin
[phonetic] for the mother land."

A party that was invented created, by the
army in 2007, and still could serve as a way

for the military to put exert influence
over the election again this time.

What then as a result is very hard to foretell?

From past experience, polling
data is pretty faulty.

Lots of people in Thailand
lie to posters deliberately,

and recent by-elections are
not a good of that guide.

If you not choose events of the past 4 years,

being the result of the last polls
need not be much for a guide.

So what's the range of possibilities?

First, Pheu Thai, the Thaksin Party
could win a majority of a large plurality

as in 2007 giving them the first
chance to form a government.

Would they then try to rehabilitate Thaksin?

They more or less said they would.

Would the army allow this result to stand?

And if not, what would they do?

This is obviously, highly problematic.

Not that you've overthrown 3 governments, can
you do it the fourth time and get away with it?

Second alternative, is of course a strong
Democrat, victory either a majority

or a strong polarity making it
possible to form a single party

or virtual single party government.

The Democrats will campaign on the platform,

but this result alone holds
out prospects for stability.

However, if they were to get in this
situation, would it put them in a position

with heavier suppression of the red movement
from their opponents, or would it put them

in a position where they're confident enough to
really move toward some kind of reconciliation?

It's very far from clear.

Many people will think that the result
would actually be a return to something

like the current Democrat-headed coalition,
in which a lot of small parties are needed

for support and the military has plenty of
scope to play politics in the background.

And the fourth opportunity is still an accident.

What I mean by that is something that happens
that means you don't have to hold, uphold.

I was saying in 2006, I though this time,

we would have a post modern
coup not an old fashion coup,

but then of course the army ran
the tanks in the style of 1958

and had the most old-fashioned
coup we have ever seen.

But this time, I think maybe you
could have something more elegant.

Suppose that the moment Abhisit calls an
election, the whole election commission resigns.

This has been floated as a possibility.

You then create a constitutional crisis
that has to be, it has to be solved perhaps

by the intervention of the monarchy
or the military or something.

Some of these is still possible.

Whatever the result, this election
is not an ending of any kind.

Since the riot Samut Songkhram in 2009,
and even more since May last year,

there has been fitful talk of reconciliation.

But this reflects the old myth
of a unified harmonious society

that can somehow be recovered.

In reality, new political forces have
challenged the way power, public goods

and social respect has been
distributed in the past.

The main agenda of the Red Shirt since
it returned to a system abandoned

for the last 6 years, where
elections determine who governs.

But their fuller agenda demands a much more
widespread overhaul of the political system,

further decentralization, end to the immunity
from officialdom, scrutiny of the judiciary,

controls on the military, guarantees
of freedom of speech and much more.

At present, the main strategy of the Red Shirts
is still to demand the return of Thaksin,

as he was the leader who
worked for them in the past

so they still see him as the
most effective mechanism.

This challenge will not be
resolved in a short period of time.

The challenge to the absolute monarchy in
1932 was not really resolved until 1958.

And the challenge issued
to military dictatorship

in 1973 was not resolved until
the constitution of 1997.

This process will take a long term, long time
and its cause and results are beyond prediction.

At present however, the old oligarchy

in the urban middle class has reacted
very strongly against this challenge.

They have mobilized the symbolic power of the
monarchy in order to gear up wide support.

And in so, that do-- so doing, have already
done huge damage to the institution.

This strategy has virtually
outlived its usefulness.

In the literature on democratization and
democratic transitions, some 15 to 20 years ago,

Thailand figured among the
countries undergoing transition.

Since the rise of Thaksin and especially since
the 2006 coup, it is often being labelled

as a hybrid regime combining elements
of democracy on authoritarianism,

yet still assuming that it is on
the right path in the long run.

But maybe, we need to accept that its
current position may actually be permanent.

Thank you.

>> Thank you.

[ Applause ]

>> If you guys, when you have a question on
this forum, let's deal with your own questions.

[ Noise ]

>> I'd want to start.

You raised the interesting point that the--

that the current government has mimicked
Thaksin's policies thus delivering them

in this patronizing manner.

And the question is why?

Is it just political ineptitude or is there sort
of a deeper paradigm shift problem or fears,

fears of changing the discourse from one about
beneficence to one about acknowledging rights?

>> Okay. The question is why the Democrats,
while they adopted Thaksin's policies,

have not adopted his style of delivering them.

>> Well, I think that this new
government particularly the Democrat.

The leader, the prime, our prime minister
come from a different background altogether

and he's an [inaudible] educator, he's
an [inaudible] educator and had come

from quite a well to do middle
class background in Bangkok.

He doesn't have the feeling for the people--

maybe he had the feeling but he
doesn't really know how to express it.

And so that the way he behave is like, he come
from bureaucracy or he's someone high up there

and giving patronage to the people.

In other words, I don't-- he's, he hasn't
yet got into, to understand that politics is

about passion, politics is also about how
you can bring the people to accept you

as their leader, as the leader
that they can touch.

I think at the moment, the people
feel they cannot touch him at all.

And this has something to do with his
upbringing, with where he come from and,

so you get the Democrat in this position.

And some of the people in the party
is a little bit like that too.

Even Chuan Leekpai who come from ordinary
person, but you know ordinary family.

But he's superior, is very bureaucratic.

He's always stand off from the people.

But you see, Thaksin, is completely
different, he come from a rich family but then,

he embraced the people, make the people
feel that he come from them or he belong

to them rather than coming from
somewhere and giving things for them.

It's a-- maybe it's a occasional
of class issue here.

[ Pause ]

>> I think you went first.

>> I totally agree with you that the next
[inaudible] is not the end of any kind.

So can you propose any solution to
the current Thai political problem?

Unless, if the election-- I mean if the Democrat
party win, the election will be [inaudible],

I believe, and if the Thai-- Thai
Rak Thai or and then the old man.

[Inaudible Remark] [Laughter]
Then so they get all the shirt,

has of high possibility to [inaudible] the game.

So, is there any solution to that problem?

>> The-- The question is
can we propose a solution--

>> Yeah.

>> -- to the current, the
current Thai political problem?

>> Uh-huh.

>> I think I would like to say that-- I think
this is not a very short process at all.

I think we're talking about a process
of change now which will take 20

to 30 years maybe even to work out.

Maybe we'll go a little bit quicker than that.

I, well I think a very interesting parallel to
take is between the charters movement in the UK

which was a demand basically for the franchise
which sort of came up in the 1830 and dribbled

on through the 1880's going up and going down to
someone, a little explosion that will go away,

if we form again, another leader
will appear and so on and so forth.

I don't think it would take that long
but I think people who were now saying,

"please find a solution for me," are
still working in this old kind of,

you know the Bureaucrats of [inaudible]
we all, we can somehow manage this.

We can write another constitution.

We can fiddle with the, the
moving parts of the system somehow

and it will all settle down,
I don't think it's that way.

I think we're in the middle of a major
historical change which at this point, the old--

the forces in power in the society have said
"no, we're going to block it as far as we can,"

and you have to get over that process somehow.

It may happen now, it may happen later.

But I don't think anyone at this
point can hand down a solution

which will send everything
back to be nice and calm again.

I think this is a fantasy that people should
get away from, that you should accept the fact,

you're in a, a momentous
historical change and go with it.

>> Yeah, may I add a little.

I think we have to accept that we are now

in a either a parliamentary
system with the constitution.

And so we should, we should obey the
rule, the politics must have a rule.

And so, if the Pheu Thai win,
I think, you know the process--

that process should allow to work itself out.

And if there's chaos then the
authority should apply the law

if the demonstrators have breached the law,
then they should, they should do something

about it rather than allowing favor to happen
for certain demonstrator and not the others.

In other words, stop these
multiple standards okay?

For example, in the US, just see in the
US, a lot of people don't want Obama

to be the president but I think he won.

They will accept and allow him to
rule for the time period he could

and then wait for the next election.

And I think Thailand will have to come
to term the issue of the rule of law.

Play within the rule rather than
wishing that, we don't want Pheu Thai

and we would support the military to make
a coup or we will support the PAD to come

out to have a demonstration
and the other way around too.

>> Yeah, I--

>> But that's a difficult--

>> I agree with that.

But the big problem is that,
there'll be no [inaudible] rule

and also is that the rule in Thailand?

>> Yes of course, of course that's part
of-- when you're allowed to do that.

>> Yeah.

>> Okay. You may not like that
and some people won't like that

but that's the rules, okay that's the way it is.

>> That will happen.

[Inaudible Remark]

>> I do have a question, but first I want to
just follow up in the [inaudible] comment.

I think you have described
the current Prime Minister,

and assuming he's called Prime Minister.

>> Yes.

>> You are describing the,
for me, a wealthy family

and they're trying to appeal
to the world classes.

I was thinking you must have a
Thai word that's similar to the one

that we have in English which is lip service?

Would you say that he's just
sort of appealing to them and,

in a form of just giving them lip service to--

he doesn't really mean in his
own intention of [inaudible]--

>> I don't think so.

I think he-- to be fair to him I think,
he means a lot of what he says but,

he doesn't really understand the
psychology of politics, the mass--

the mass politics, the psychology
of the mass politics.

And, you know if you will stand in
front of him, he'll go-- away from you.

He'll do that.

There's no, [laughter] yeah I don't
know how to, how to, you know,

you can only think of Nehru in India.

He also was brought up like this, and
before he could embrace the people,

he had travelled on his own for a year amongst
ordinary people and then worked with them to,

so that he can appreciate them, understand
them, and know how to embrace them.

I don't think our politician who come from this
sort of background have had that experience,

and certainly Kuhlna Abhisit [phonetic]
have had some experience talking to people

in the urban area of Bangkok, but
not really much in the country side.

>> My real question actually.

>> Hold on a second.

>> My real question was a, you've had
the course throughout in election;

you had the military, military method.

It seems that whoever has the military on their
side, it really determine election is that,

has the military shifted [inaudible].

>> So the question is-- is it
that whoever has the military

on their side can determine the election?

Well, I mean you have-- what happened in 2007
was, this was up when the coup government came

to an end, then they went
back to an electoral system.

The military tried extremely hard to win that
election with the Democrats fundamentally.

To the point of forming political
parties, funding political parties,

sending soldiers to stand intimidating
the ballot boxes on polling day.

Doing, doing a lot of propaganda or
military radar, whether in the television,

sort of dirty tricks to try and undermine
the opposition, all those things,

and they still couldn't win, right?

They still-- in fact, the better the name I
had thought, but was still not in a position

to prevent the pro-Thaksin party having
the plurality, at the largest plurality

and therefore, the first
chance to form a government.

Now, the question is now, nobody really knows
what will come out, the result right now.

So but if, which is one possibility,
we will go to an election.

That will again be this similar attempt to
try and influence the result before it happens

but there is still also the
opportunity that might not work.

So we have many unknowns here, many unknowns.

But undoubtedly, the position of the military
is now stronger, they're not any stronger,

and more important for determining the politics
than any time than to just being since 1992

and probably since the 1970's, not
just come about because of many things,

because of the way they changed
that laws under the coup government

because of new repressive laws they bought in
bringing back ISOC, the old body which used

to be there in the past of the times of
the-- question of the communist insurgency,

they bought it back now, and essentially seeing
into to stop politics, to stop popular politics.

So they are now an incredibly,
institutionally powerful position.

So yes they are, they are the people.

>> There is also a possibility of a wide-cut.

In the sense that you know if, as time goes
by, if the situation in such that Pheu Thai

with Yingluck as the head of the party showing
a good prospect of reading a huge majority.

There could be some change on
the other side, the Democrat.

Because he's a Democrat, he's really very
serious about being part of the next government,

they may have to try to do something
like changing the leader of party,

because politics in Thailand is never
view-- is so difficult, it's a paradox,

and no one is really, they saw Thai where
no one is a real enemy so-- of each other.

Some kind of coalition could always happen.

And you can imagine a situation where the
Democrat completely decided that they want

to save democracy, and forget about the military
and the people behind them and said okay,

"Let's do it something so that we
could have a coalition with Pheu Thai".

That's a wide-cut, another wide-cut that can
happen I think, but we have to wait and see.

>> Oh sorry, just [inaudible] as he speak.

>> Yes?

>> 2 questions, at one point you
showed a map of ethnolinguistic groups,

and it makes me wonder whether there's something
essential about their ethnolinguistic character.

Is it more a matter of their
mode of incorporation into the--

the nation-state and then if we take
into account mode of incorporation, does,

is ethnolinguistic category, [inaudible].

The second question is, this
has to do with the monarchy.

So, I mean to the [inaudible], if the king were
20-years younger than he is now, would any of--

would we be having any of this kind
of conversation, so is there something

about a sense of stability with the monarchy
that is, that is driving much of the story,

does some monarchy shows up a little
bit, and the story that you tell about--

>> Can you repeat that?

>> -- but not very much.

>> Uh-hmm.

First question is you know, how does the,

the distribution of ethnolinguistic
groups affect political affiliations?

It is as you say, the second or the, as
you say it is, it's because of the nature

of their incorporation into the nation-state.

So, if you go back to the late 19th
century, the areas in the North

and the Northeast was still referred
to by the Bangkok elite as Lao.

And that was-- be-- like in calling them
second class citizens or even if you know it,

those sort of conquered citizens as well.

And, although of course, over time that, those
sort of attitudes have softened somewhat.

They're still very much there in the background.

And what you see in that picture
in there with the person saying

"uneducated people" is a
reflection of that same idea.

People who come from the Northeast,
uneducated, they're buffalos and so on.

So it's, it's there, and that's the way that
division is now reflected into modern attitudes.

Bangkok people feel them, see it,

so Bangkok middle class people
feels themselves to be superior.

People out in the North, and Northeast
hate this, resent this terribly.

They've never been able to say this before,

it's been part of the repression
in the political culture.

But now suddenly they can and this
of course is very, very shocking.

The second, the second, question is whether if
the monarch was 20 years younger than he happens

to be, would this make the tensions any less?

>> Well if you're referring
to the issue of succession.

Now people fear Thaksin returning or Pheu
Thai Party heavy on majority so much.

Maybe, it's related to the
issue of succession in this way.

Some people said, they fear that Thaksin,

Thaksin had good relationship
with prospective next monarch.

And if him or his derived party became a
government, then there is a possibility

that he could return to Thailand?

>> Thaksin can return under a
new, rich, or under a new reign?

>> Thaksin.

Thaksin, could return to
Thailand under a new reign.

And he'll create, he will
create havoc in Thai society.

Because the 2 sign, that the yellow who
dislike him would come out in the street,

and the red will come out in support of him.

So there'll be great chaos.

And a lot of people also believed that
Thaksin will not come as a passive person

and he will come and will enter politics again.

Because a pardon would be and then
he could run the election again.

So this is a one way of expressing
the fear of Thaksin

and how it might be linked
to the issue of succession.

>> Some people think this is the major,
major issue behind the current turmoil.

No, we think it's an added complication-- the
issue of mass politics is a much bigger issue.

The monarchy is just being mobilized and come
to as part of the, as part of the opposition

to this big social change that's going on--

>> Yeah, yeah.

>> -- and the succession is contemplating.

>> Right, in other words, we think that, what's
happening in Thailand now, since Thaksin came

into power, he had shown that a popular politics
could work for a majority of people and that,

that idea of parliamentary democracy is
kind of getting established in Thailand.

But that has challenged, the position
of the middle class to fear that if

that who become the nob in Thailand
they themselves will lose the control

of the political process because
of the politics of [inaudible].

So they would try to prolong--
or change that development, okay.

>> Professor William [phonetic] has
questions, his first question is more

or less my question but, I'm going to tackle
that one a little bit about the South,

just in the South just not at the
same sort of history is the Northeast

and the North [inaudible] center
or there's something else going on?

>> Uh-hmm, yes.

>> Does the question--

>> Yeah, yes.

Is the South-- how is the South
different from North and the Northeast?

Yes 'cause in a sense, the South is also an area

that was incorporated quite,
quite late but not so late.

The South is really very, very
different socio-economically.

If you're talking about North and
Northeast, you're talking about a base

of peasant agriculture, small--
small scale agriculture.

In the peninsula south that's
a relatively a minor part.

It's much more urbanized.

You have, you have city towns and cities in
this area if you can trace by 2000 years,

you know go back to Chinese
sources and, and that's something--

it's major occupations are
plantations, mining, fishing and so on.

They tend to be-- [Inaudible Remark]
-- they, they're much larger.

They're much sort of larger scale of operations.

The-- Its population is far less Thai, you know,

it's got a much more cosmopolitan population
particularly having a very high concentration

of Chinese, you know, Chinese who have
blended into the population not just

over the last 100 years but
over the last 500 years,

maybe coming for a long,
long, a long, long time.

So it's both sort of ethnically and economically
very, very different from these other areas.

But I think the most important part of it
is, it's just simply much more urbanized.

You have this well-establish
most of the people not mostly--

a very high proportion, the people who
live in rather well-established towns

which has got a much a more developed civil
society than you have in the other parts

of the country where, still
fundamentally peasant agriculture

in the towns could be very new.

[ Pause ]

>> So you mentioned that in the democratization
literature, the middle class are sort

of the forces with democracy
but in Thailand's case,

now you mentioned that they
[inaudible] the upper middle classes?

Can you tell a little bit
more about why that is?

I know you mentioned that, you
feel that their interests would be,

would be affected by having a pro-Thaksin
party in the power, but, I guess,

I'm not sure of what, what would go around this.

Like it probably, [inaudible]
concern is among the middle class?

And also when you-- when you discussed, you
know, these cultural stereotypes, kind of,

so what's the roots of why would they
align this all to the middle class,

I mean and not with the lower classes or
you know, and is it just the geography

that stereotypes, that there
are actually small numbers?

>> The question is why has the middle class
politics seem to turn against democracy?

What is this-- what is the background behind it?

I think there are many things.

I think one is, if you look at the, if you
look at the pattern of economic development

of Thailand over the last 50 years,
on the society that it is created.

And you can compare it to-- one of
the things in the paper we've done is

to compare it particularly to Japan and Korea

that have different-- similar
stages of development.

What you see is that Thailand, by relying
so heavily on foreign direct investment

and export-oriented manufacture, has
developed a rather unusual society.

It has a very small working task,
it might be to 8 to 10 percent,

you know people who were actually working
in big factories or actually producing most

of the wealth which is you
know, by exports okay?

You then have quite a small
professional middle class,

a professional managerial bureaucratic class,

which is basically created
to service this economy.

But it's not more than you can
calculate in different ways 15--

>> Sir, 13 percent.

>> -- no 13, 15, and 17 percent, you
can calculate it in different ways.

And if you'd look at, you know, Japan and Korea
parallel times, it's at least twice that size

where you had much bigger-- you had much bigger
industrialization, much bigger working task

and also much bigger managerial class.

And then what Thailand has got is 2/3 of its
people still who are either doing 2 things

or either doing agriculture which
is now, you know, very complicated

but they're still doing agriculture.

Or, they're in, the informal sector that
means a lot of them migrating back and forth

between the country and the city.

They're working as vendors, casual laborers,
small businesses and these sorts of things.

They're not in their-- they're not
in their, you know, tax paying,

social security covered for [inaudible] economy.

And what-- I think what just happened-- I think
the other part, the other part about the--

is the middle class, is that it's small.

It's very largely Sino-Thai.

So it's very largely from families--

most of whom who have arrived in
Thailand over the last 2 or 3 generations.

And we forget it now because it's Sino-Thai

in the last 20 years have
become so well-established.

In Thailand, they've become,
may now run everything.

They now run the urban economy whether
it's the ajahn or the military or whatever.

It's very heavily Sino-Thai.

You go back to the 1980's and you'll
remember the Sino-Thai was still complaining

about being distributed against,

still complaining about being
second class citizen and so on.

So that sort of habilitation, to be so
central to the society is very recent.

So the-- you know, the cultural memory is
obviously still there, and I think this,

this contributes enormously to this
insecurity which is driving some

of the way they're responding to this politics.

And remember that Sondhi, Sondhi Limthongkul,
who became the great leader of the Yellow Shirts

in 2006, 2007, deliberately
positioned himself as a good Chinese.

I mean, he went out of his
way to position himself.

[Inaudible Remark] No, yeah, was it?

>> Lukjin Watchia [phonetic]

>> Lukjin Watchia we, sons of China love--

>> Love.

>> -- the country and defend the king.

I mean it was actually explicit, and he
wears this funny hat which makes himself,

you know, look like a [inaudible].

Very, very deliberate use
of the symbols as well.

>> Yeah. Can I add, just to give you example.

There's always an economic aspect to all these.

The middle, the urban type middle class,
if they're so used to being able to benefit

from 99, 95.9 percent of the total budget every
year until the decentralization instituted

in the 1997 constitution, we stipulated that
from now on, there will have to be a process

of relocation of the annual budget
to the countryside up to a 35 percent

of the total budget, by such and such here.

And even, and this show you that the
people have got so used to being dominant

in every area including the budget.

And then recently, the issue of fiscal
reform, tax reform has come into fall

when it now become clear that the government
has to take up the populist policies,

with that turned into a welfare
or social security policies,

which mean that the government has
to find a revenue from somewhere.

So let's not talk about fiscal reform,
and what is the reaction from some

of the economists who work in big banks?

They come out to say, "You cannot do

that because the tax reform would
mean there'll be an increase impact

on us who pay most of the taxation.

And who's going to benefit from that, not us.

It's the people out there.

And so they said, go slow on these and
these will reduce economic development.

It will reduce highland economic growth,
and this kind of a talk is now going on

and it received a lot of report
from the urban middle class.

So there is an economic issue of the allocation
of resources in the process of democratization.

>> How about if you speak a little bit more
about the allocation of these resources, I mean,

been talking about the [inaudible] coalitions in
the inequality and society but now also speaking

about how much of the benefits growth are going
through the southeastern to the urban part

where there still seem to be a
lot of structural inefficiencies.

They keep people in the core
classes specifically thinking here

about the aristocratic nature
of the bureaucracy.

If there is any talk about
reforming these sectors to move away

from an often socially destructive,
I mean distribution

of wealth towards the more
creation of [inaudible].

>> The question is has there been an
attempt to move away from this concentration

of wealth to distributive wealth--

>> Policies.

>> -- policies?

The-- When the Democrat came to
power 2 years ago, they-- one of--

the policy platform they
adopted was a fiscal reform.

And they wanted to introduce development
tax which mean that people who have,

in order to reduce the speculation of land which
mean that people who have land and do nothing

on it will pay a little bit higher tax
than people who make use of those land.

And the differences is not very great you know,

in term of degradation of
the increase in the taxation.

And, in the beginning, everybody was very
excited about that, but, only a month ago,

they have decided, before this election
came, they have decide to set aside that.

The process started to process
this in the parliament

but they now said they will be withdrawing that.

[Inaudible Remarks]

>> On institutional reform, there was a movement
that in the early 2000, I'm sorry, in the 1990--

late 1990's particularly under the democrat
government of Chuan to reform the military.

And it is at the earlier stages of this two.

The military is very oversized.

There are what, 1600 generals, approximately,
which only 200 of them actually have a job

to do, and all kinds, there's all kinds of
problems as, enormous problems over purchasing

of weapons and all these kinds of things.

But in the end, then there's also
promises, there are reform plans--

the military squashed it all, absolutely
totally, there's been really no--

that downsizing-- known reduction
in the number of generals.

And since they've came back
into influence in 2006,

they've multiplied too much the military
budget by 50 percent already, and got enormous.

They're now trying to buy
submarines, for Christ sake.

>> Second-hand submarines.

>> Second-hand submarines.

To go with the echo of Caryo [phonetic]
which then goes nowhere, the Eshek [phonetic]

which goes nowhere and now
we have the submarines go.

So, and then, Thaksin came in with his, in many
ways, his major campaign issue when he came in,

in 2000 which reformed bureaucracy.

He set him up so far to saying,
you know, all these other people

who have stowed in this bureaucratic culture.

I'm a businessman, I'm going to change
this whole bureaucratic culture by doing,

turning it into a more business oriented.

And he, he had, he used this phrase CEO.

We have to turn him into CEO,
ambassador, CEO, governors.

He bought the official soul in, and got you
know, business school people to lecture them

and tell them on how they were going to change.

He set up a whole process for changing the
structure, the bureaucracy, and all of these.

And of course, that part of
throwing him out was the stop path.

And I think that a lot of the opposition
to him came from the bureaucracy

which did not want to be reformed in this way.

So that now is dormant and the
Bureaucrats are back in the spades.

>> I think this political turmoil in terms

of all the Thai new generation becomes
true I think in-- out of my own experience.

I know we'll become [inaudible]
politics before this, this crisis.

So do you have any recommendations or
suggestions for the new Thai generation?

It can fall back and have a-- improve in
any issue or to sustainable development.

[Simultaneous Talking]

>> Their question is, is there any
advice for the Thai new generation

who are getting more involved in politics?

You have to answer that.

[Laughter] [Inaudible Remark]

>> Well you know, you have to go with the time
because you cannot go back globally if you know.

Although democracy, parliamentary democracy
may have its flaw and in some countries,

people become disillusioned with it.

But it has proven that it has,
it is the most efficient system

that could help us manage conflicts
in a period of this quick change.

So that I think we should try to stick to it
and improve it along the way rather than using--

>> Other methods.

>> -- other methods of military
intervention which is shunned globally.

>> One of the first things about, of the 2007
election was how much solid area it was among

the Red Shirts that despite the 18 being banned,

they still voted as-- as
a block for [inaudible].

Now we're on the city-- and now our
own committees have been around city,

I'm wondering what your sense of-- to
the level of solidarity in the likelihood

that that collection of an interest
will stick together or the likelihood

that it will fragment and, and so, in what
ways did you see that fragmentation occurring?

>> So, the question is, how likely it is

that the Thai will be more fragmented
this time than it was in 2007.

Yes, there are certainly
some considerable problems.

For instance, we went to one part
of the Northeast a few months ago

where there clearly was a lot of tension
between the Red Shirt activist in the town

and the Pheu Thai MP's because of what
had happened in May 2010 last year.

However, you have to say, what you've been
reading in the Bangkok Press carefully

in the last couple of months, there had
been considerable attempts within Pheu Thai

to accommodate the Red Shirts, to
negotiate this thing rather than to,

you know, to have it turned out to mess.

I think, there was a danger that if you read the
Bangkok Press now, they're very anxious to play

up this kind of theme because the most
extraordinary thing throughout this whole

affair, is that the Bangkok press
thinks that people in Bangkok don't want

to read anything except good news.

They want to read bad news about people they
hate and good news about people they love rather

than knowing what's going on, right?

[Laughter] And it's quite extraordinary.

So, we never have any move, you know,
we have this extraordinary organization

and everything else going
on outside and you know,

the Bangkok has got its blinkers
on, it's not even looking at it.

So I think you, all of these stories that
come out all the time about all [inaudible]--

there's a lot of mess inside the party.

Don't listen too much.

>> Let me add, my informant in Maha Sarakham.

I talked to him just before I came here,
said that, I asked him on discussion

and he said that, "Well, let's talk
about the ordinary people on the ground.

What are they doing?"

They are certainly excited about
the election but they also know

that even though Pheu Thai gets the majority,
they may not be able to form a government.

So they are forming groups among themselves.

These are ordinary people, the villagers;
here they have groups particularly

after the incident in April and May last year.

They meet regularly to discuss the politics.

And they're talking among themselves,
what is the significance of this election?

How should we view it?

And some of them will say, even if
we loose, this is very important

because it's a chance to show our preference.

It's a chance to show our stand, where we are.

And so, there are a lot of
these discussion going on.

And honestly, their love of resentment
against the local MP's who did not help them

after the incident because a lot of these
MP's which is sitting on a you know, like a--

>> On the fence.

>> -- on the fence to see
where things are going.

And so, some of them will say, they don't
want to support that, those MP anymore.

But some are saying, but then, they are
expecting the party may change some candidate.

Certainly there was some
was shifting to Bhumjaithai.

Because it's also very interesting
to watch what kind

of a campaign tactics Bhumjaithai
is going to use.

And the change of the-- what
you call of the change of-- ?

>> Electro system.

>> -- the electro system which happened
before now have been design in such a way

that it will benefit a smaller party
like Bhumjaithai who may not be able

to win the whole [inaudible] and
they, then they will take up some.

And Bhumjaithai is also buying up
a lot of the MP's to move to them.

And there will be some in the
Reds who will move with them

because people still have the
loyalty to some of this local MP.

[Applause] Thank you.

[ Applause ]